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Abstract: Increasing food insecurity levels and large import expenditure have been major concerns for the government of Zimbabwe in 
recent years, leading to the development and implementation of different policies aimed at addressing these issues. In the wake of the 
devastating drought of 2015, in which only a quarter of the country’s annual maize requirement was produced, the Zimbabwean government 
instituted a targeted command agriculture scheme known in policy terms as the Special Maize Programme for Import Substitution (SMPIS). 
The programme aimed to increase maize production and to reduce the grain import expenditure of the country. The scheme, although viewed 
by many as a panacea to the country’s increasing food insecurity levels, was equally criticised by many as a drain on the highly depleted 
financial resources of the country, and arguments have emerged on the merits and demerits of the scheme for the struggling economy. This 
paper analyses the impact of the SMPIS on maize production and importation in Zimbabwe, as well as the gains and losses of the programme 
to the Zimbabwean economy. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Maize is the most important cereal crop in 
Zimbabwe, with a large percentage grown directly 
for home consumption, according to the Famine 
Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET 
2016). Zimbabwe recorded an increased deficit in 
maize production from 2009 to 2015, leading to the 
country’s increased dependence on maize 
importation from neighbouring countries such as 
Zambia and South Arica (Food and Agricultural 
Organisation Statistics [FAOSTAT] 2016). This 
reduced output in maize production followed a 
general decline in agricultural output since the Fast-
Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) was 
implemented from 2000 to 2006 (Zikhali 2008; 
Chilunjika & Uwizeyimana 2015, p. 131). Since 
2012, the Zimbabwean government has employed 
a series of policies and institutional reforms 
intended to increase the productivity of the 
agricultural sector. The targeted command 
agriculture scheme1, known in policy terms as the 
Special Maize Programme for Import Substitution 
(SMPIS), is one of the policies implemented by the 
government following the dismally poor yield 
recorded in the 2015/2016 planting season. The 
planting season saw the country experiencing a 
prolonged dry spell that led to a poor maize yield of 
511,816 tonnes, which is approximately a quarter 
of what is needed to feed the nation (United Nations 
International Trade Statistics Database [UN 
COMTRADE] 2017). Zimbabwe needs 1,8 to 2 
million tonnes to feed both its citizens and livestock 
annually (FAOSTAT 2016). The poor harvest of the 
2015/2016 season forced the cash-strapped 
government to spend millions of dollars on maize 
imports to avert a food shortage. Import quantities 
(shown in Table 1) totalled over 821,000 tonnes in 
2016 due to the recorded poor yield following one 
of the country’s worst droughts of the decade, 
which was believed to have been caused by El Niño 
(United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 
2017).   
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1 The SMPIS programme/scheme was generally referred to as 
command agriculture by the government and that became the 
name commonly used for the programme. People generally do 
not know why it was called “command” but that was the 
common name used in Zimbabwe; however, for the sake of 
consistency, the authors will use the acronym SMPIS.  
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Table 1: Quantity of maize imported by Zimbabwe 
Code Product 
Label 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Imported 
quantity: Tonnes 
Imported 
quantity: Tonnes 
Imported 
quantity: Tonnes 
Imported 
quantity: Tonnes 
Imported 
quantity: Tonnes 
1005 Maize or Corn 433,057 303,452 287,432 571,775 821,672 
Source: UN COMTRADE (2017) 
   
Table 2: Zimbabwe Corn Production for 2010-2016 
Year Production  
(1 000 MT)2 
Growth rate 
2010 1,000 53.85 % 
2011 1,010 1.00 % 
2012 999 -1.09 % 
2013 857 -14.21 % 
2014 1,456 69.89 % 
2015 742 -49.04 % 
2016 512 -31.00 % 
Source: Index Mundi (2019) 
 
As depicted in Tables 1 and 2, maize 
production in Zimbabwe from 2012 to 2016 was 
below the country’s annual requirements and the 
import quantity of maize into the country moved in 
tandem with the production quantity. Maize is the 
main staple food crop of Zimbabwe and is very 
strategic for the food security of the nation (Food 
and Agricultural Organization [FAO] 2006). The 
SMPIS was therefore necessitated by the steady 
increase in the food insecurity level in Zimbabwe 
from 12% in 2011 to 42% in 2016 due to a decline 
in total maize production from approximately 1.3 
million metric tons (MT) in 2010, to 0.7 million MT 
in 2015 (Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization and 
Irrigation Development [MAMID] 2015). The high 
import value was also a key motivation for the 
SMPIS command scheme instituted by the 
government in 2016 as a contractual farming 
programme aimed at attaining national maize self-
sufficiency. The programme command agriculture 
scheme was therefore welcomed by many as a 
panacea to the hunger threatening millions of 
Zimbabweans and as a practical solution to 
Zimbabwe’s huge grain import expenditure. In the 
words of former Finance Minister, Mr Patrick 
Chinamasa, “the command agriculture programme 
was designed to solve a fundamental problem 
facing the country in the aftermath of the land 
reform; that of mobilizing sustainable and 
affordable funding for our agriculture so as to 
ensure food security, eliminate imports of food, 
increase exports from this sector and reduce 
poverty” (Chisoko & Zharara 2017, p. 4). Based on 
                                                            
2 MT ‐ metric tons 
the statement, it is evident that the SMPIS was not 
only seen as a safeguard against hunger but also 
as a means of reducing maize imports into the 
country. The timing of the SMPIS fitted into the 
broader national objective of reducing foreign 
currency loss through excessive imports; an aim 
echoed in the official policy title of the command 
scheme.  
It is important to note that maize, as the nation’s 
staple, is a controlled product in Zimbabwe, which 
means that the government controls its purchase 
and sale, and the terms of such regulations are 
defined by the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) Act. 
In terms of the GMB Act (section 33 (1)), “no person 
shall sell or otherwise dispose of any controlled 
product within the prescribed area except to the 
GMB”. White maize, which is preferred by the 
people, accounts for most of the maize produced 
and consumed by Zimbabwean citizens, while 
yellow maize, although grown in significant 
quantities, is primarily used as livestock feed 
(FEWSNET 2016). In contrast to most developed 
countries, the demand for maize for food use 
accounts for over 75% of the domestic demand in 
Zimbabwe, while approximately 15% of the 
domestic demand is for livestock feed (FEWSNET 
2016). The Zimbabwean Vulnerability Assessment 
Committee (ZimVAC 2015) reported that four 
million people in Zimbabwe needed food aid in 
2016 because of the 2015 drought. The 
government stated that the decision to embark on 
the SMPIS programme was a temporary measure 
   
 
3 
 
to reduce grain imports, increase maize production, 
and enhance national food security.  
 
 
1.1  The Special Maize Programme for Import 
Substitution (SMPIS)  
The SMPIS commenced in October 2016 and 
was to continue for three planting seasons and a 
total amount of US$500 million was budgeted for 
the scheme to be rolled out over the three growing 
seasons (Pindula 2017). The scheme was funded 
through a public-private partnership between the 
government and an international commodity firm, 
Sakunda Holdings, was claimed to be the major 
funder of the scheme, with lines of credit extended 
by various financial institutions (Mhlanga 2017). At 
the launch of the programme, former Finance 
Minister, Patrick Chinamasa, reported that the 
government was working with the private firm to 
mobilise the funds needed for the 2016/2017 
farming season, a total of US$192 million. The role 
of the private partners was chiefly that of providing 
capital and coordinating the marketing of produce, 
including exporting, sharing of best practices and 
farming knowledge, and transfer of expertise 
through farmers training, while the role of the 
government was to provide an enabling 
environment and oversee the whole process (The 
Periscope Report 2017). 
According to the FAO (2006), Zimbabwe has 
five agro-ecological regions, known as Natural 
Regions, according to rainfall patterns, soil quality, 
and vegetation. Most of the maize in Zimbabwe is 
grown in Natural Regions II and III. The total 
amount of arable land targeted for the scheme was 
400,000 hectares (ha) and 2,000 farmers were 
expected to participate in the programme. A total of 
264,000 ha out of the 400,000 ha were to be 
cultivated under irrigation, while the remaining 
136,000 ha would be rain fed. The scheme targeted 
two groups of farmers: farmers with irrigation 
facilities and adequate farming equipment, and 
farmers near water bodies who are not fully 
equipped with irrigation and rely on rain-fed 
agriculture. An important criterion was that the 
farmers would be able to set aside 200 ha of land 
for maize production for the period of the scheme. 
Each participating farmer was required to commit 
five tonnes of maize per ha towards repayment of 
advanced loans in the form of irrigation equipment, 
seed, fertilisers, chemicals, mechanised 
equipment, tillage services, and electricity and 
water charges, all of which totalled $250,000 per 
farmer for the entire period of the scheme. Five 
tonnes per ha means each participating farmer 
must produce 1,000 tonnes of maize for the 
government yearly (The Periscope Report 2017). 
The remaining harvests of the farmers above 1,000 
tonnes were to be kept by the farmers to sell to 
private enterprises or the GMB for US$390 per 
tonne – a price reportedly higher than what other 
countries’ governments were paying per tonne in 
the region (FAO / Global Information and Early 
Warning System Reference [GIEWS] 2017).  
It is important to note that Zimbabwe has six 
farmer groups. A1 farmers are mostly small-scale 
farmers with farm sizes averaging 6 ha, A2 
commercial farmers with medium- to large-scale 
farms, A2 communal farmers with mostly medium- 
to small-scale farms, old resettlement farmers, 
small-scale commercial farmers, and peri-urban 
commercial farmers (Commercial Farmers’ Union 
of Zimbabwe [CFUZIM] 2016). The two types of 
farmers are different in the sense that A2 communal 
farmers are new farmers who have been allocated 
plots on communal lands and are mostly performing 
medium- to small-scale farming on communal 
lands. Old resettlement farmers are those who were 
farming before the FTLRP was instituted (Zvoushe, 
Uwizeyimana, & Auriacombe 2017, p. 123). The 
SMPIS was targeted explicitly at A2 commercial 
farmers because of their farm sizes (The Periscope 
Report 2017). The SMPIS was also complemented 
by another programme known as the Presidential 
Input Scheme (PIM) (Mrewa 2015). The 2016/2017 
PIM targeted 1,4 million farmers, comprising A2 
communal farmers and A1 farmers who produced 
maize, small grains, tobacco, cotton, and others. 
Sakunda Holdings, an international commodity 
firm, funded both schemes for the 2016/2017 
growing season with $192 million budgeted for the 
command scheme and $30 million budgeted for the 
PIM (Mrewa 2015). Both schemes aimed at 
rebuilding the grain reserves of the country to 
improve maize sufficiency and food security.  
 
2.  PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The SMPIS faced a great deal of criticism from 
other farmers and agro-processors in the first 
cropping season (2016/2017) of implementation. 
Many of the critics questioned whether the 
programme brought about any positive impact on 
the import situation of the country, the use of scarce 
foreign exchange for imports, and especially on the 
funding of the scheme and payment of the debt 
incurred (Mutenga 2017).  
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According to Freeth (2016, p. 1), “[t]he latest 
unfolding command agriculture catastrophe will 
result in three outcomes listed as follows:   
 The Western world will once again have to 
come to the rescue of starving 
Zimbabweans and provide massive 
quantities of food aid, which is in itself a 
controversial issue across Africa. 
 The Zimbabwean people will be saddled 
with a yet larger debt to repay to finance the 
2,000 farmer beneficiaries with their quarter 
of a million dollars. 
 The corrupt and sycophantic political elite 
will continue to fund their lavish lifestyles 
with additional money that the bankrupt 
Zimbabwean state cannot afford”. 
In addition to the critics, Mutenga (2017) 
presented arguments that while on the one hand 
the SMPIS led to lower demand for grain imports, 
on the other hand it increased imports of inputs 
such as fertilisers and agro-chemicals, which 
defeated one of its aims of raising foreign currency 
reserves. There is therefore a need to analyse the 
SMPIS and its outcomes in terms of its impact on 
maize production and importation in Zimbabwe and 
draw implications regarding the effects of the 
scheme on the Zimbabwean economy. 
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
This analysis was conducted using data from 
the Zimbabwe’s MAMID, CFUZIM, published 
newspaper articles, and published data from the 
FAO’s country briefs, the United States Agency for 
International Development’s [USAID] Strategic 
Economic Research and Analysis (SERA), and 
Index Mundi. The study also made use of search 
engines with combinations of the following search 
terms: command agriculture, maize, yield, imports, 
prices, and Zimbabwe.  
 
4.  FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
4.1  Impact of the command scheme on maize 
production  
According to the FAO/GIEWS (2017), the total 
cereal production for the 2016/2017 season was 
2,7 million tonnes, inclusive of wheat, with a 
significant increase in maize, sorghum, and wheat 
production. Overall maize production in 2017, 
including from those under SMPIS, was 
approximately 2,1 million tonnes, which was slightly 
lower than the government’s prediction of 
2,2 million tonnes from the scheme alone, but 
significantly higher than the last season when 
merely 511,000 tonnes were primarily attributed to 
the devastating drought.  
The scheme was also extended to wheat 
farming, which is the second most important cereal 
crop in the country, according to the FAO (2006). 
Being a winter crop, the scheme for its production 
kicked off in May 2017, and like that of maize, the 
programme was a success in terms of the increase 
in yield. There was an estimated yield of 158,000 
tonnes, up from the previous year’s 20,000 tonnes 
(FAO/GIEWS 2017).  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Zimbabwe’s cereal production for 2016/2017 planting season 
Crop 2012-2016 averages 2016 2017  2016/2017 change 
Yield (000 tonnes) Percentage 
Maize 913 512 2,156 321% 
Sorghum  58 36 182 406% 
Millet  37 29 107 269% 
Wheat 23 20 158 690% 
Others  69 59 91 54% 
Total  1,136 656 2,694 287% 
Source: FAO/GIEWS (2017) 
 
According to the government’s final crop 
assessment report of 2017, the scheme produced 
only about 30% of the country’s maize output in the 
2016/2017 season. The total output from the A2 
commercial farmers, most of whom were part of the 
SMPIS, was 643,790 tonnes, or just under 30% of 
total production. The output falls far below the 
expectation by the A2 farmers at the beginning of 
the scheme. Out of the 400,000 ha initially targeted 
for the programme to produce a minimum of 
2 million tonnes on an average yield of at least 
5 tonnes per ha, only 168,666 ha were under the 
command scheme, and the average yield was 3,68 
tonnes per ha (Mutenga 2017). 
   
 
5 
 
 
Table 4: The estimated maize area planted, production, and yield by different categories of farmers in Zimbabwe for the 
2015/2016 and 2016/2017 cropping seasons 
Farmers  Maize output 
2015/2016 (tonnes)  
Maize output 
2016/2017 (tonnes) 
Contribution to total 
output in 2017 (%) 
2016/2017 change 
from 2015/2016 (%) 
A1 farmers 122,358 521,588 24.2% 326% 
A2 commercial farmers 162,665 643,790 29.9% 296% 
A2 communal farmers 166,216 770,682 35.75% 364% 
Old resettlement farmers 40,359 147,068 6.8% 264% 
Small-scale commercial 
farmers 
14,893 64,538 3% 333% 
Peri-urban farmers 5,325 7,680 0.35% 44% 
Total  511,816 2,155,346 100% 421% 
Source: Mutenga (2017)  
 
Communal farmers, many of whom were 
beneficiaries of the $30 million support from the 
PIM, retained their position as the mainstay of 
Zimbabwe’s maize production, with a total output of 
770,682 tonnes. A1 farmers produced 521,588 
tonnes, and old resettlement farmers produced 
147,068 tonnes. Small-scale commercial farmers 
and peri-urban farmers produced 64,538 tonnes 
and 7,680 tonnes respectively (Mutenga 2017). In 
total, 1,875,297 ha were used for growing maize in 
Zimbabwe for the 2016/2017 growing season. 
Zimbabwe’s MAMID forecasted at the beginning of 
the season the production of at least 2,2 million 
tonnes of maize from the over 1,8 million ha planted 
at the end of the summer season, up from 511,000 
tonnes in 2015/2016 and 300,000 tonnes more than 
the local consumption of 1,8 million tonnes. 
According to Mutenga (2017), the expected yield of 
2,2 MT was on the assumption that there would be 
an improvement in yields from the previous year’s 
0,8 tonnes per ha due to sufficient rainfall during the 
season.  
 
Table 5: The estimated maize area planted, production, and yield in the different provinces of Zimbabwe for the 2015/2016 and 
2016/2017 cropping season 
 2015/2016 2016/2017 
Province Corn area 
planted (ha) 
Production 
(tonnes) 
Yield 
(tonnes/ha) 
Corn area 
planted 
(ha) 
Production 
(tonnes) 
Yield 
(tonnes/ha) 
Mashonaland East 122,546 89,338 0,72 218,559 274,491 1,26 
Mashonaland Central 136,201 110,316 0,81 229,917 455,486 1,98 
Mashonaland West 123,651 143,573 1,16 279,456 543,622 1,95 
Midlands 163,164 52,049 0,32 392,777 321,394 0,82 
Manicaland 99,285 71,774 0,72 264,695 267,369 1,01 
Masvingo 66,668 11,818 0,18 245,178 150,938 0,62 
Matabeleland South 18,521 17,793 0,42 117,531 74,287 0,63 
Matabeleland North 44,281 15,155 0,34 127,184 67,759 0.53 
Total of provinces 763,317 511,816 0.66 1, 875, 297 2, 155, 346 1,15 
Source: USAID SERA (2017) 
 
There was a general increase in maize 
production in all the provinces in Zimbabwe in the 
2016/2017 cropping season (USAID SERA 2017). 
Mashonaland provinces in the northeast of 
Zimbabwe experienced the most significant 
increase in the 2016/2017 cropping season under 
the SMPIS, with Mashonaland East experiencing a 
48% increase, Mashonaland Central a 31% 
increase, and Mashonaland West a 35% increase. 
Matabeleland North recorded an increase of 28% 
and Matabeleland South recorded an increase of 
31% from the previous year. The lowest increase in 
maize output for the first year of the SMPIS 
occurred in the Midlands and Masvingo provinces, 
with a recorded increase in maize output of 19% 
and 8.5% respectively. The Mashonaland 
provinces fall under the Natural Regions known for 
maize production and other cash crops (FAO 
2006). The production of cash crops like cotton and 
tobacco was also estimated at high levels in 2017, 
given the adequate rainfall and input support 
programmes like the PIM. The Zimbabwean 
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government said that the 2016/2017 command 
scheme achieved its intended purpose of boosting 
maize and other cereal production in the country 
(Mutori 2017). For the first time in years, the 
government was able to fund schools with maize to 
feed children during school hours. The claim, 
however, according to Mutenga (2017), was 
rejected by many based on the fact that the scheme 
fell short of its expected outcomes.  
 
Table 6: Zimbabwe’s cereal production for the 2017/2018 planting season 
Crop 2013-2017 averages 2017 2018 2017/2018 change 
Yield (000 tonnes) Percentage 
Maize 1,113 2,156 1,701 -21.1% 
Sorghum  85 182 78 -57.1% 
Millet  51 107 58 -45.7% 
Wheat 51 158 200 25.6% 
Others  72 91 101 11.0% 
Total  1,356 2,694 2,138 -26.0% 
Source: FAO/GIEWS (2018) 
 
The hectarage for maize production increased 
by 40% in the 2017/2018 growing season from 
168,666 ha of the previous year to 235,256 ha; 
however, the total output for cereal crops exclusive 
of wheat for the 2017/2018 command scheme 
decreased by 23,6%, with maize decreasing by 
21,1% (FAO/GIEWS 2018). The reduced output 
was mainly due to unfavourable weather conditions 
at the beginning of the planting season and a 
prolonged dry spell in the middle of the growing 
season that affected the yield. Import of cereals into 
Zimbabwe for the 2018/2019 marketing year 
remained low given the bumper output and the 
large carryover stock from the 2016/2017 planting 
season. Wheat production for 2017/2018 increased 
by 26,5% from the previous year’s yield of 158,000 
tonnes to 200,000 tonnes (FAO/GIEWS 2018). The 
government extended the scheme to other sectors 
such as soya bean and livestock in the second 
season, but it was not as popularly accepted as in 
the first season (Scoones 2017). 
There is an estimated decrease of over 40% in 
output for maize for the 2018/2019 planting season, 
with total production pegged around 800,000 to 1 
MT (FAO/GIEWS 2019). What this implies is that 
Zimbabwe will need to import maize in the current 
year. The number of maize ha planted decreased 
by 36%, according to the MAMID, and the national 
average maize yield estimation was approximately 
0,98 tonnes per ha compared to the previous 
season’s 1,2 tonnes per ha (CFUZIM 2019). Wheat 
uptake for the 2018/2019 planting season is also 
reportedly low due to input price increases and the 
general downturn of the economy (CFUZIM 2019). 
 
3.1  Impact of the command scheme on the 
domestic price of maize  
Prices of different brands of maize meal (the 
country’s main food staple) in 2017 were notably 
low and well below the previous year’s prices. 
According to the Zimbabwean FEWSNET (2017), 
cereal prices in the country declined in July 2017 to 
their lowest levels in five years on the back of the 
good agricultural season.  
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Figure 1: Zimbabwe’s retail prices of maize meal from January 2009 to March 2019  
Source: FAO/GIEWS (2019)  
 
According to the FAO/GIEWS (2019), the price 
of maize meal was broadly the same in 2018 as in 
2017 due to overall adequate domestic supplies. 
Prices followed that of the 2017 trend from January 
to March, and peaked between February and 
March due to increased demand on markets and 
reduced supplies from source areas; however, the 
prices were below 2016 prices and the five-year 
average by 5% to 15% and 5% to 10%. The prices 
of wheat flour increased sharply towards the end of 
2018 due to foreign exchanges shortages for the 
importation of an adequate quantity of grains. The 
reduced import volumes limited milling operations, 
which caused an increase in prices. Prices are 
estimated to rise by 5% to 10% in 2019, considering 
the expected decrease in maize yield and slow 
uptake of wheat by farmers this growing season 
(FEWSNET 2019).  
 
3.2  Impact on maize imports 
There was a significant decrease in grain 
imports following the bountiful harvest of the 
2016/2017 season under the command scheme. 
The import expenditure for maize dropped by 
92,86% in 2017, and the government announced 
that it was banning the importation of maize into 
Zimbabwe (Mutori 2017). Zimbabwe over the years 
spent millions of dollars on grain importation from 
Brazil, Mexico, and neighbouring Zambia 
(FAOSTAT 2017). According to Mutori (2017), the 
government saved over $200 million on its grain 
import expenditure due to the success of the 
2016/2017 command scheme.   
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Zimbabwe’s maize imports by years 
Market year Imports Unit of measure Growth rate 
2010 300 (1,000 MT) 0.00% 
2011 475 (1,000 MT) 58.33% 
2012 600 (1,000 MT) 26.32% 
2013 900 (1,000 MT) 50.00% 
2014 500 (1,000 MT) -44.44% 
2015 800 (1,000 MT) 60.00% 
2016 1,400 (1,000 MT) 75.00% 
2017 100 (1,000 MT) -92.86% 
2018 300 (1,000 MT) 200.00% 
Source: Index Mundi (2019) 
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The total cereal output in 2017/2018, the 
second growing season under the scheme, was 
lower than the first year’s growing season because 
the cropping season did not experience as much 
rain as the previous season. Zimbabwe imported 
maize and wheat, but imports were generally low 
due to the large carryover stocks from the 2017 
bumper harvest, which met the bulk of the 
consumption requirements (FAO/GIEWS 2019). 
There is an estimation based on statistics from 
Zimbabwe’s MAMID that the country will need to 
import 600,000 tonnes of maize to add to the 
800,000 tonnes in reserve and the estimated 1 MT 
yield to ensure maize food security in 2019 
(Zimbabwe Business Times 2019).  
It is also important to note that while, on the one 
hand, 2017 saw a highly reduced demand for grain 
import in Zimbabwe, on the other hand, there was 
an increase in the importation of agricultural inputs 
to meet the farmers’ input requirements for the 
programme. The government lifted an earlier 
imposed ban on the import of fertilisers to fulfil the 
command scheme’s requirements. Under the 
programme, 5,563 tonnes of seed, 57,440 tonnes 
of basal fertilisers, and 21,387 tonnes of top-
dressing fertilisers were distributed (CFUZIM 
2019). Fertiliser, seeds, agro-chemicals, and 
especially farm machinery were imported 
massively in the 2016/2017 agricultural season by 
the government and some private enterprises. The 
question therefore remains if there was any positive 
impact from the command scheme on the country’s 
scarce foreign exchange situation. 
 
3.3  Other impacts of the SMPIS programme 
Apart from the impact on maize production and 
importation in Zimbabwe, the SMPIS also impacted 
on the Zimbabwean economy in other ways. There 
was a significant impact on the production of other 
crops and on the finances of the country.  
 
3.3.1  Switching of production  
The command scheme led to many farmers 
switching production to maize and other grains 
funded by the programme. Notably, soya bean 
farmers switched to maize production in the 
2016/2017 season. According to the CFUZIM’s 
president, Wonder Chabikwa, “farmers dumped 
soya bean production and embraced maize 
cropping under the $500 million command 
agriculture scheme” (Nyoni 2017, p. 1). 
Zimbabwean farmers in the past are known for 
switching production to whatever crop brings in 
more money, which was witnessed during the 
Zimbabwean tobacco boom of 2013/2014 where 
many farmers switched from maize production to 
tobacco production. This switching of production 
resulted in the Oil Expressers’ Association of 
Zimbabwe (OEAZ) member companies turning to 
importation since local supply was not adequate 
(Nyoni 2017). The 2016/2017 season saw 
approximately 50,000 tonnes of soya beans 
produced while Zimbabwe’s annual requirement of 
soya beans is approximately 220,000 tonnes 
(Basera & Mushoriwa 2017). Soya shortages 
threatened the poultry, piggery, dairy, and fish 
industries, which require soya-based feeds. 
Imports of crude cooking oil, soya cake, and raw 
soya bean grain gobbled up millions of scarce 
foreign exchange in 2017. According to Scoones 
(2017), the government did not consider the effects 
of funding only maize/cereal growers, which 
automatically caused most farmers to switch 
production. The SMPIS was extended to the soya 
bean sector for the second season to reduce 
switching of production by more farmers and to 
increase soya bean output for the nation.  
 
3.3.2  Finances 
Although the funding for the scheme came from 
a partnership with private firms, the government 
incurred a budget deficit of $118 million, which was 
due to the subsidy availed under the programme 
(Pindula 2017). The shortfall came about from the 
disparity between the price that the government 
paid the farmers for maize supplied and the price it 
sold to associated millers – a grouping of 
approximately 100 of the biggest private millers in 
the country. According to Pindula (2017), the 
government paid farmers $390 per tonne while 
selling to members of the Grain Millers Association 
of Zimbabwe at $242,50 per tonne. The Grain 
Millers Association committed to buying 800,000 
tonnes from the state for $194 million. This meant 
that the government subsidised $147,50 per tonne, 
totalling $118 million. Private players, on the other 
hand, offered lower prices of between $280 and 
$310 per tonne to farmers willing to sell to them.   
The subsidy has been described as a fiscal 
nightmare, especially as there were no clearly laid-
out plans of how the government intended to 
recoup the amount spent on the programme 
(Mutenga 2017). Critics pointed out the fact that no 
measures were put in place to prevent the reselling 
of maize to the government and that corrupt people 
could benefit massively from the command scheme 
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by repeated buying and reselling of maize from and 
to the government. Maize bought from the 
government for $242,50 can be resold to the 
government at $390 again and again. The 
International Monetary Fund also raised concerns 
that the subsidy would be challenging to monitor, 
and that maize can easily be smuggled across 
borders into Zimbabwe for sale to the government, 
especially as neighbouring governments offer lower 
prices for maize to their farmers (Mandizha 2017). 
Financial analysts claim that the cost could be 
much higher than the calculated $118 million, 
especially if the government bought more maize 
than initially intended. All this, of course, 
contributed to increasing the Zimbabwean 
government’s debt.  
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
The past few years saw Zimbabwean farmers 
complaining about being short-changed by private 
contractors. The complaints were mostly about the 
inadequate and late supply of inputs by private 
contractors who then demand the whole crop at the 
end of the season, leaving the farmer perpetually 
impoverished (Chikwati 2017). Consequently, the 
SMPIS scheme, with its low input prices and 
demand for only a portion of the crop, became very 
popular with the farmers and many signed up for 
the first and second seasons. The scheme for the 
2017/2018 season, however, turned out to be less 
successful than that of the 2016/2017 growing 
season. Debates on the success of the third season 
(2018/2019) are still ongoing and can only be 
conclusive at the end of the season. The SMPIS 
scheme for 2016/2017 is considered successful in 
many quarters. Many, however, do not think it a 
success and are quick to point out that the 
presumed success of the scheme rode on the back 
of one of the longest, wettest seasons on record. 
Historically, there is a correlation between good 
rainfall and high yields of maize in Zimbabwe; 
therefore the fact that the adequate rains received 
in the 2016/2017 growing season played a 
significant role in increasing production output 
levels cannot be disputed. Supporters of the 
scheme argue that Zimbabwe has had years in the 
past in which it experienced good rainfall yet was 
not able to produce enough to feed its citizens since 
the FTLRP was initiated. What is sure, however, is 
that the command scheme demonstrated that given 
the right support in terms of timely inputs and with 
adequate rains, Zimbabwe’s farmers have the 
capacity and determination to achieve maize 
sufficiency for the country.   
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